One contribution of 17 to a theme issue 'Urban flood resilience'.
This paper examines recovery after major floods in the UK and Germany. It focuses on two areas that were badly hit by flooding: Catcliffe, near Sheffield in the UK, and Passau in Bavaria, Germany. It reports on surveys of residents and businesses in each place and on surveys of national flood experts in both countries. The two events were comparable in terms of impacts, levels of preparedness and government response and show similar patterns of speed and quality of recovery. In Germany, it took about 18 months for 90% or more of residents to get back to normal, while in the UK it took a year longer. This difference may be related to funding; in the UK, over 90% of funding came from household insurance while in Germany over 60% came from federal aid, which may have been quicker. In both countries, the economy had recovered to near normal within 12-18 months. The majority of people surveyed in both countries (74% in Germany and 67% in the UK) believe that their homes and businesses are as just as vulnerable now as they were before the respective floods. However, in the UK, half of the respondents thought their neighbourhood was safer and better prepared compared to only 11% in Germany. This may be because substantial progress has been made in improving protection in the UK in areas flooded in 2007. Both floods were considered to be 'game-changers' and resulted in a heightened awareness of flood risk, increased investment in flood defences and an increasing emphasis on citizens
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to report the speed and quality of recovery of communities affected by floods, following events in the UK in 2007 and in Germany in 2013. The study focuses on two places that were severely flooded: Sheffield and Rotherham in South Yorkshire, UK, and Passau, in Bavaria, near the Austrian border, Germany. Both places have been flooded numerous times. Sheffield was flooded most recently in 2000 and 2007, while Passau, at the confluence of the rivers Inn, Ilz and Danube, was flooded in 2002 and 2013. In both places, face-to-face surveys were conducted with local residents and business people who experienced flooding and online surveys were conducted with flood experts.
Recovery is defined as 'returning to a normal state after a period of difficulty' and most (lay) people think about disaster recovery as a return to normality [1] and an attempt to bring the postdisaster situation to some level of acceptability [2] and normal level of performance [3] . In this paper, since complete restoration may take a very long time, we argue that a concept of 'close to normality' is more meaningful and we therefore define recovery as being when 90% of displaced people have returned to their repaired homes, 90% of disrupted businesses are back in operation and 90% of the affected working population has returned to work.
However, a different question is whether getting back to normal conditions is at all a meaningful goal. Post-disaster 'normal' may not be a return to the same status as before the event; in fact, this may be undesirable if the quality of a system could be improved to enhance resilience. Recovery from disaster may be envisaged as a process of resilience building, whereby the capacity of a community to spring back after the initial shock of a disaster is increased [4] . Floods can act as catalysts for human adaptation [5] and there is a 'window of opportunity' in the early phase of recovery to improve resilience or 'build back better' [6] . A balance must be achieved between speed and enhanced resilience [7] .
It has been suggested that the basic functions of a community should be restored within two years to ensure successful recovery [8] . Within this period, governments are required to manage a disaster and restore functionality of critical systems, and so issues relating to an event are pushed high up the policy agenda [9] .
UK floods 2007
During the summer of 2007, a series of destructive storms hit many parts of the UK [10] . Average rainfall across the country was more than double the seasonal average and some areas received a month's precipitation in 24 h [11] . In the north of England, flooding was particularly severe along the Trent catchment in and around Hull, Sheffield and Doncaster. In the south, Gloucester, Tewkesbury, Cheltenham and Oxfordshire were flooded along the Severn-Avon catchment and the Upper Thames valley (table 1). The 2007 flood events cost the UK economy USD 3.3-4.9 billion [13] . Thirteen people died and hundreds had to be rescued. Around 48 500 homes were affected, each costing on average USD 32 000 to repair. The repair cost for flooded businesses averaged between USD 95 and 142 000. While almost every business was adequately covered by insurance, a quarter of affected homes were not fully insured [14] .
In Sheffield, the River Don burst its banks, flooding mainly commercial and industrial units. Catcliffe, our UK study area, is a village suburb northeast of Sheffield. During the night of 25 June, the River Rother overtopped its banks, flooding nearly 200 homes in Catcliffe (about 50% of total in Catcliffe). Flood depths were so high that about 100 bungalows were almost completely submerged the lowest parts of the village [12] . Over 700 residents were evacuated after cracks appeared in the dam at Ulley reservoir [15] and the M1 motorway was closed [16] .
In both Sheffield and Hull, the drainage systems were unable to cope, in part because of inadequate maintenance [17] . In Hull and the East Riding, 20% of homes were flooded [10] . In Yorkshire, four major and 55 secondary substations were flooded, disrupting the electricity supply to 130 000 people, including residents in Catcliffe, for more than a fortnight [18] . The flooding also had psychological impacts and long-term mental health effects [19] [20] [21] . A survey of 2265 people in South Yorkshire reported that mental health issues were significantly higher among flood victims [22] .
In the UK, two million homes were at flood risk (in a 1 : 100 year flood hazard area) in 2005 [23] . By 2018, largely because of continued construction on flood plains, that estimate had risen to 5.5 million homes [24] . In terms of awareness and preparedness, The Pitt Review [25] found clear evidence that the UK was inadequately prepared for the 2007 floods. In the UK, population growth has driven extensive building on flood plains despite scientific understanding of the associated hazard. The review also presented evidence that storm drains in new housing developments had not been checked and adopted by the appropriate water authorities, drains and rivers in urban areas were blocked, while culverts and ditches in rural areas had not been kept clear and maintained [26] . UK businesses at risk of flooding also showed a lack of preparedness that affected their rate of recovery [27] . A case study of businesses near Catcliffe concluded that in spite of some level of preparedness against direct impacts, there is considerable lack of preparatory measures for the indirect effects of flooding and business interruption [28] .
German floods 2013
In May 2013, total rainfall amounted to three times the monthly average throughout Germany and record river levels were recorded throughout the country. Most major catchments in Germany, apart from the Rhine, experienced some level of flooding. Flooding progressed along the Elbe catchment, a main artery flowing north through Germany to the North Sea, and along the Danube catchment, flowing east through southern Germany into Central and Eastern Europe. In Germany, disaster alerts were declared periodically between May and June in eight of Germany's 16 federal states [29] .
The 2013 floods affected 600 000 people, caused 14 fatalities and cost the German economy USD 6.7-9.1 billion. In total, 80 630 residents in eight federal states were evacuated. In terms of financial loss, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Bavaria were the three most affected German states [30] .
Passau is situated at the confluence of the rivers Danube, Inn and Ilz, and the highest water level (12.85 m) since 1501 was recorded. Passau's Old Town in the heart of the city was at the centre of the flood zone and water reached the second floor of some buildings [31] . The 2013 floods were not as severe, however, as the 2002 floods, which caused 20 fatalities and the evacuation of 337 000 people [32] . Improvements in structural defences meant most places experienced less damage in 2013. However, some areas, including Passau, were not as fortunate. The German transport network was severely affected, and over 700 km of roads and 150 bridges were damaged and the German Railways Corporation was forced to close 60 routes. Psychological impacts were also significant and a survey of 710 residents affected by flooding across Germany in 2013 found that, in terms of recovery, the amount of damage was less important than psychological factors [33] . In Germany, three million people live in areas that are considered flood-prone, with a 1 in 10 year probability of experiencing potentially damaging and life-threatening river floods [34-36]. There were improvements in preparedness after the 2002 floods [37] and a survey of residents in Saxony found significant improvements in preparedness between 2002 and 2013 [38] . In 2013, 23% were very well prepared compared to only 3% in 2002 and 78% of respondents said they were completely unprepared in 2002, compared to only 19% in 2013. More significantly, there was major investment in flood protection. In the Elbe catchment area, dykes were rebuilt or reinforced, and mobile flood barriers were used to hold back water in the Elbe, Danube and Vltava [39] . Table 3 compares the UK 2007 and German 2013 floods and shows that the scale of the floods was comparable, with the German floods perhaps twice as severe in terms of people displaced and economic loss. The main difference was that Government aid in Germany was considerably higher than in the UK [41] .
Methodology (a) Surveys of households and businesses
Interview surveys were conducted with people living or working in two places badly affected by the floods Sheffield in South Yorkshire, UK and Passau in Bavaria, Germany. Within these cities, residential areas in the flooded zones near the river were chosen because people there were more likely to have experienced flooding or be aware of the risks. Nearly two-thirds of people surveyed lived within 1 km of the river that flooded (65% UK; 63% Germany) and about half had experienced being flooded (44% UK; 55% Germany). In Sheffield, Catcliffe, a village close to the River Rother between Sheffield and Rotherham was targeted. Although Sheffield city centre We used maps of flooded areas to identify households and businesses to target for interview in advance and we also made appointments by telephone to meet and interview people working in local organizations affected by the flooding, including the library, church, cafes, the supermarket, bars, garages and the cinema. Over 90% of the surveys were conducted face-to-face with residents and local business people who had experienced some level of flooding. The remaining interviews were conducted on the telephone. People living and/or working in the affected places were asked three simple questions.
1. When do you feel you got back to or almost to normal? How many months was this after the flood? If you are still recovering, how long do you think it will take? 2. Do you feel your home is safer and better able to cope with another flood, less able or about the same? 3. Do you think the local area has been made safer and more resilient, or about the same or worse?
The interviews in Catcliffe were conducted over 4 days in early November 2018 and in Dreiflüsse-Eck over 5 days in early April 2019. In both countries, native language speakers who were familiar with the flood risk management supported the interviewer, a non-native speaker, to make sure there were no misunderstandings.
Although the sample sizes were relatively small (32 in Catcliffe and 74 in Dreiflüsse-Eck) they are fairly representative of the populations living in both places. In the Catcliffe, 44% of respondents were female compared to 62% in Passau. In the Sheffield, 51% of inhabitants were female and in Passau 52%. In Catcliffe, 76% of respondents travelled to work by car compared to 37% in Germany. This corresponds roughly with the modal split in the two places; in 2018, 60% travelled to work by car in the Sheffield City Region and 51% travelled by car in Passau. The educational level of people surveyed in Catcliffe was also very similar to that of adults in Rotherham and Sheffield [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] .
(b) Surveys of flood experts
Separate surveys, with more detailed questions, were also conducted with recognized flood experts in each country. These included environment agency personnel, insurance assessors, academics and flood risk management consultants. One hundred and fifty experts were contacted by email in the UK, 27 responded, a response rate of 18% and in Germany 110 experts were contacted and 21 responded, a response rate of 19%. Participants were asked how long it took for different aspects of society, including permanent housing, the economy and critical infrastructure, to get back to normal, defined here as a 90% return to the pre-disaster state or a new stable norm? Experts were asked specific questions about the speed and quality of recovery.
1. How long did it take or will it take for the aforementioned sectors to recover 90% or more or to get to a new stable norm? 2. How have the aforementioned sectors changed compared to before the disaster? (5-point scale, much worse to much better plus do not know).
They were also asked questions about the impact of the disaster, the role and performance of the state, the impact of insurance sector on the speed of recovery, and finally about the amount and speed of funding. Statistical tests were used to measure the significance of the results. For ordinal data, for example, impact and vulnerability, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test for two sample cases was used. The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was applied to multiple samples, for example, to compare quality of recovery in different sectors. For interval data, for example, speed of recovery, the T-test was used.
Results

(a) Impact of the floods
There is a growing understanding that speedy recovery and enhanced resilience is associated with a complex interaction of factors including the speed and adequacy of funding, governance, decision-making and preparedness [51] . Nevertheless, the severity of the flood impacts is also important [52] [53] [54] . Experts in the UK and Germany were, therefore, asked about the impacts, in terms of damage and loss to different socio-economic sectors, of the UK 2007 and the German 2013 floods. Figure 1 shows that, in the opinion of experts, some sectors, for example, housing, suffered a greater impact than others (Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA p < 0.001). Employment was not as severely affected and one might, therefore, expect it to recover more quickly. The pattern of damage across all sectors was remarkably similar in the two case studies (in all sectors Mann-Whitney U-test p > 0.05).
(b) Speed of recovery
A key measure of recovery is the time taken for a household or an area to return to normal after a flood. The survey of local residents showed that the speed of recovery was similar in the two case studies, but slightly faster in Germany, although the difference was not statistically significant (t-test p > 0.1). In both countries, over half the respondents recovered within 1 year. In Germany, it took about 18 months for 90% or more of residents to get back to normal, while in the UK, it took a year longer (figure 2). This difference may be related to the funding mechanism. In the UK, over 90% of funding came from household insurance while in Germany over 60% came from federal aid, which may have been quicker. Of the surveyed residents, in the UK 89% had household insurance that covered flood damage, compared to only 21% of respondents in Germany. Figure 2 shows a close correlation between local residents' memories of how long it took to get rehoused and experts' impressions of the speed of housing recovery for both the UK and Germany (t-test UK and Germany p > 0.05). Any small difference may result from a difference in the wording of the question to each group. Residents were asked to say exactly how long it took to get into their own home while experts were asked to say how long on average they thought it took people to be rehoused. It is interesting to see that experts tend to underestimate the rate of recovery of the first two years. However, expert opinions and respondents' experience match for a period of 3-5 years or longer. Experts were also asked about the rate of recovery in various socio-economic sectors for both countries. Figure 3 shows the pattern of recovery for the three key sectors of housing, the economy and infrastructure. In both the UK and Germany, experts considered that it took slightly longer for housing to recover than the economy and infrastructure, but any difference between sectors was not statistically significant (ANOVA UK p = 0.2, Germany p = 0.3). In both countries, the economy had recovered to near normal within 12-18 months.
These findings are supported by other research. In the UK, at the end of May, 11-12 months after the floods, local authorities estimated that about 75% of households were back in their homes [25] and the economy of the Yorkshire and Humberside Region had returned to pre-disaster production levels within 14 months [55] . In Germany, a survey of 752 flood-prone residents 18 months after the event revealed that 52% of respondents had almost fully repaired the damage to their buildings and 28% of respondents said they were back to normal [33] . Only 20% of respondents were some way from completion or indicated that the flood event still strongly affected them.
(c) Quality of recovery
Residents were asked about their perception of changes (since the flood) to the flood safety of their home and neighbourhood on a five-point scale, from much safer and better prepared too much worse. Most interesting, the reported pattern of vulnerability of the home is almost the same in the UK and Germany (Mann-Whitney U-Test p = 0.94). Almost the same proportion of residents in the UK (29%) and Germany (26%) believe that their homes are now safer and better prepared than prior to the flood ( figure 4) . However, the majority of participants in both countries (74% in Germany and 67% in the UK) believe that they are as just as vulnerable now as they were before the flood. These results are supported by a survey of nearly 1000 residents in Saxony [37] . After the 2013 floods, 68% of residents said that their situation in terms of safety and amenity was the same. However, 30% said it was worse or much worse. Similar percentages were obtained for recovery after the 2002 floods (same 69%, worse or much worse 28%).
There was a clear and significant difference in opinion between case studies (Mann-Whitney U-Test p < 0.01) in terms of the vulnerability and preparedness of their neighbourhood ( figure 4 ). In the UK half of the respondents thought their neighbourhood was safer and better prepared compared to only 11% in Germany, where 86% thought their neighbourhood was just as vulnerable. This difference in perception may be explained by differences in terms of flood protection and mitigation measures between the two case studies. Experts in the UK and Germany were asked detailed questions about how different aspects of society and the economy had changed compared to before the disaster. Figure 5 shows that experts in Germany believe that there has been a modest improvement in all sectors after the 2013 floods (Mean = 3.2-3.5, Mann-Whitney U-test p = < 0.05). However, in the UK, experts thought only housing and infrastructure had shown any improvement since the 2007 floods.
Local people were also asked about their level of preparedness. In Catcliffe, 50% of respondents felt they were at high or very high risk of flooding compared to 27% in Passau. Yet only 28% of respondents in Catcliffe and only 15% in Passau felt they and their families were well or very well prepared for future floods.
(d) Funding recovery: role of the state and the insurance sector
There was a clear difference in funding between the UK and Germany; 63% of experts in the UK considered funding to be inadequate compared to only 6% in Germany. Only 19% of expert respondents in the UK and 5% in Germany thought funding was too slow ( figure 6 ). The key difference between the two countries, however, was the source of funding. In Germany, flood insurance penetration was relatively low at 32% in 2013 compared to 75% in the UK in 2007, which meant recovery in Germany was more reliant on state aid and the Federal Government had to come to the aid of flood victims. These figures correspond closely to those in the case study areas. In Catcliffe, 79% of respondents were insured compared to only 21% in Passau.
The total flood aid budget in Germany was e8 billion, of which e1.5 billion was earmarked to repair federal infrastructure and the rest was split evenly between the federal government and the states [56] . The UK 2007 floods were exceptional and insurers have said that because so many properties were flooded (55 000 recovery [25] . Nevertheless, over half the experts in the UK (54%) and over a third in Germany (39%) thought that insurance reduced recovery time by 12 months or more ( figure 7) .
Experts in Germany thought that the Federal and State authorities performed better than UK experts felt the UK local and national government performed. Figure 7 shows that 64% of experts in Germany thought the State performed well or very well compared to only 12% in the UK. Experts in the UK and Germany were also asked what they thought went particularly well or badly in managing the floods. What is striking is that their comments are remarkably similar (table 5). Experts in both countries highlighted an improvement in storm forecasts and warnings compared with previous floods, improved collaboration and coordination between agencies and emergency services, mutual support that meant communities were more resilient and recovered quicker and finally the initiation of flood resilience improvements. In terms of things that went badly experts in both the UK and Germany highlighted the overwhelming scale of the floods, coordination difficulties and long-term psychological issues. On the other hand, the states and task forces were unprepared and under resourced for the scale of the disasters; flood defences were inadequate and critical infrastructure was vulnerable; and in both countries some flood victims suffered long-term psychological effects.
The benefits of flood insurance are clear: insurance not only compensates for loss but also reduces risk by mapping flood hazard, declining cover and thus encouraging better practice [57] . The Association of British Insurers (ABI) estimate that the average payout for the UK 2007 floods was between £15 000 and £45 000 against an average household insurance premium of £339 [14] . The impact on wellbeing is also significant. A study into the health impacts of flooding -forecast and warning much better than in 2002 -cooperation among authorities, and authorities with rescue team -long-term volunteers support -coordination between volunteers and the city -better preparedness than 2002 -awareness and preparation have increased a lot since 2002 -2013 flood damage was one-third of 2002 due to better preparation -tipping point in disaster preparedness and prevention in regard to flooding and storm surge -warning and evacuation better than in 1953 -swift response of Fire service and Environment agency -improved communications, better collaboration, better media reporting -coordination private and public/charity sector -local authority wardens worked to build community resilience -community support and response -insurance company's initial response rapid -set in motion improvements to early warning and more resilient infrastructure -task forces unprepared for scale of flood -state aid for uninsured injured parties undermines incentive for personal provision -wrong warning of flood height and flood characteristic surprised residents at night -some coordination problem in the field due to differences in mentality -better communication is needed with public, disaster financing and insurance -getting flood help is too bureaucratic during disaster -dyke defence is not always successful -slow dyke constructions along the Danube -long-term psychological effects -state unprepared to deal with severity of flooding across multiple river basins -local authority almost invisible -lack of infrastructure preparedness -few had signed up to flood warnings, few understood division of responsibilities -delay to assess and repair flooded properties, meant people were displaced for a long time -blocked drains caused flooding -government grants poorly administered -lack of understanding of resilient construction -inappropriate repair of traditionally constructed buildings in 30 different locations in England and Wales concluded that having adequate insurance cover reduced stress, and incurring uninsured losses had negative health effects [19] . A health impacts survey for the Pitt Review found that being displaced for long periods had a significant effect on people's wellbeing. In Germany, despite a comparatively lower level of insurance, insurance companies also played an important role in the recovery process, paying e1.8 billion in compensation [37] . Both countries have a private market approach to flood insurance. However, the continued availability of domestic flood insurance at a reasonable cost has been under pressure for some years following an increase in the number and severity of flood events [58] . The increased incidence of flooding presented insurers with a dilemma. Insurers could either carry on facing repeated huge claims from a minority of claimants, or exclude hazardous areas with a high probability of flooding. FloodRe is the current UK approach to deal with the issue that some homes are at such a high risk of flood that they are uninsurable. FloodRe is a not-for-profit reinsurer run by the insurance industry and funding for the scheme comes from a levy on insurers according to their market share. It is only intended to cover those properties most at risk-about 1-2% of domestic households [59, 60] . It is still unclear how sustainable this approach is as the levy will taper off and cease by 2040 [61] and FloodRe does nothing to encourage property owners to take flood mitigation measures [62] . After the 2002 floods, the German Insurance Association (GDV) took an important step in flood risk assessment. Advances in geo-information sciences and data availability meant that more detailed probabilistic flood modelling became feasible which meant premiums could be more reliably priced and the risk could be transferred from the state to the private insurance and reinsurance sectors [63] . Insurance penetration although still low in Germany (41% nationwide in 2018) is set to rise substantially as the federal government will no longer offer compensation to the uninsured [64] . Bavaria has announced that, from 1 July 2019, it will no longer provide emergency financial aid following natural disasters to victims who could have purchased insurance [37] . Since 2013, federal states, insurance associations and the insurance industry have adopted numerous measures to increase risk awareness among homeowners and businesses in Germany. The GDV regularly updates and improves its flood mapping and state governments have launched extensive information campaigns.
The insurance sector could play a bigger role in both countries in 'building back better'. Risk reflective insurance premium pricing could encourage engagement with mitigation measures [65] , for example through insurance discounts once the measures are installed. In Germany, insured households are more likely to undertake risk reduction measures than uninsured, suggesting that flood insurance does set an incentive for policyholders to take action. However, in Germany insurance companies do little to encourage precautionary measures [40] and in the UK only 55% of insurance brokers thought insurers should allow customers to pay towards more resilient repairs [66] .
Flood resilience and management
Flood risk is similar in the UK and Germany and the costliest natural hazard in both countries. Yet there are clear economic benefits of improving flood resilience. For example, the monetary benefit of measures designed to keep water out of those properties with an annual chance of flooding of 2% or above outweighs the investment cost by a factor of at least 5 [67] . Significant areas of both Germany and the UK remain reliant on flood protection measures that are at risk [68] and both countries now have broadly similar risk management approaches, namely 'Making Space for Water' in the UK [69] and 'Room for Rivers' in Germany [70] , that primarily replace traditional engineered flood defences with a mix of natural flood management measures including regulating land use and promoting flood insurance as a risk transfer mechanism [71] . Both countries are improving their hazard mapping and beginning to tighten land use and planning controls to discourage or prevent development on flood plains. Table 6 lists the key reforms and initiatives and the following section describes the changes in detail. 
(a) UK flood resilience and management
Progress is being made in improving flood resilience in the UK. Following the 2007 floods in the UK, the Environment Agency warned that the average annual cost of flood damage could rise by 60% by 2035, unless funding for defences was doubled to £1bn a year [72] . The Pitt Review recommended putting communities at the heart of flood management through the strengthening of Regional Flood and Coastal Committees. It also recommended technological advances in managing flood risk [73] , developing engagement processes with those exposed to flood risk [74] and recommended addressing the 'recovery gap', which sees residents having to negotiate a maze of agencies and companies involved in flood recovery [75] . In response to the near misses with infrastructure failure in 2007, the UK government initiated sector resilience plans that set out the resilience of critical infrastructure to hazards [76] . These plans are produced annually and assess the risk and vulnerability of each infrastructure sector, the desirable level of resilience, a programme of actions for achieving the desired resilience level and methods of reporting progress [18] .
The Flood and Water Management Act 2010 implemented the Pitt Review's recommendations and made unitary authorities and county councils (i.e. upper-tier authorities) the Lead Local Flood Authorities for developing a local flood risk management strategy, cooperating with other risk management authorities, investigating flooding in its area, maintaining a register of structures vulnerable to flood and carrying out works to manage flood risk. An evaluation of the response to the Act by DEFRA concluded that although these arrangements were proving effective their application in different authorities was patchy [77] . In December 2014, the Government announced a £2.3bn flood defence spending programme, meeting the Environment Agency's predicted long-term investment need [78] . The Met Office and the Environment Agency have set up a 'world class' joint office to provide more accurate flood warnings and mapping and the Environment Agency has instigated a series of further developments including making flood warnings available on Facebook [79] .
However, the picture is not entirely positive. The Pitt Review called for flood resilience to become the norm and the Bonfield Report [80] recommended a package of measures to improve property resilience. But houses are still being built on flood plains and even the most detailed house survey only provides basic information about flood risk and fails to indicate how badly a property could be affected in the event of a serious flood [81] . There is a growing impression that although the UK Environment Agency has made great strides, it does not have strong enough powers, for example it is unable to veto plans to build on a flood plain. Building regulations need tightening and there are concerns about the use of unrealistic hard edge flood mapping that ignores the risk outside perceived flood-prone areas. Most recently, the Environment Agency in the UK has launched a new long-term strategy for flood and coastal resilience that acknowledges that some communities pose such high flood risk that they may need relocating [80] .
(b) German flood resilience and management
In Germany, after the 2002 floods, a number of weaknesses were identified, including deficient flood warnings, poor maintenance of flood protection and a lack of risk awareness. Efforts were made to develop an integrated system of flood management [82] and improvements were made to warnings and dissemination of information, which led to some households being better prepared for the event in 2013. Several legislative initiatives were launched, including the German Flood Protection Act of 2005 and the EU Floods Directive of 2007, that considered both structural and non-structural means of mitigating damage. An evaluation of these post-2002 improvements showed that there had been a greater consideration of flood hazards in spatial planning and urban development, comprehensive mitigation and preparedness measures within properties, more effective flood warnings, a more coordinated disaster response and more targeted maintenance of flood defence systems [34] . These led to better flood management in 2013 and, thus, reduced damage, estimated to be e6-8 billion compared with over e11 billion in 2002. However, in many cases, buildings that were flooded in 2002 were flooded again in 2013 because no improvements to flood resilience had been carried out. There was a lack of awareness about how structures could be made more flood-resistant and little incentive to inform building owners about how this might be done. There are also few rewards to rebuild in a better, more flood-resilient way [83] .
After the 2013 floods, the federal government approved a national flood protection programme, the Nationales Hochwasserschutzprogramm, due for completion by the end of 2020. The programme includes dyke relocation, controlled flood retention and the elimination of weak points in existing flood protection [84] . The total budget for the programme is e5.4 billion. Similar to the UK, there is an increasing emphasis in Germany on citizens' taking responsibility for their own flood preparedness and protection. A survey of 889 households affected by the 2013 floods explored ways of encouraging citizens to take responsibility and improve household resilience in partnership with the State [85] . There is evidence homeowners are willing to make investments in mitigation [86] and research suggests that to increase take-up communication in Germany should focus on the potential of flood mitigation measures to effectively reduce or avoid flood damage, as well as on information about how to implement such measures in practice [31] .
Conclusion (a) Speed of recovery
Summarizing the results of the surveys of residents and experts in the UK and Germany, the impact of the floods across various sectors and the speed and quality of recovery was remarkably similar in both case studies. In both case studies, over half the respondents recovered within 1 year. In Germany, it took about 18 months for 90% or more of residents to get back to normal, while in the UK it took a year longer. In Germany, 93% had returned to normal in under 2 years, while in the UK, 78% had recovered in the same time period. These differences may be related to funding; in the UK, over 90% of funding came from household insurance while in Germany over 60% came from federal aid, which may have been quicker. In both countries, the economy had recovered to near normal within 12-18 months.
Comparing the speed of recovery in different sectors, experts in the UK and Germany consider that employment and infrastructure recovered more rapidly than housing, although the differences were not that pronounced.
(b) Changes in resilience
Only a small proportion of residents in the UK (29%) and Germany (26%) believe that their homes are now safer and better prepared than prior to the flood. The majority of people surveyed in both countries (74% in Germany and 67% in the UK) believe that their homes and businesses are as just as vulnerable now as they were before the respective floods. This reflects the fact that most homes were repaired without the addition of any flood protection or damage alleviation measures. By contrast, half the respondents in the UK (50%) thought their neighbourhood was safer and better prepared compared to only 11% in Germany, where 86% thought their neighbourhood or town was just as vulnerable. In the UK, the survey was conducted in an area where the Environment Agency has installed major flood protection measures since 2007.
(c) Were the floods 'gamechangers' Extreme events can be catalysts for policy change and both floods provoked significant changes in flood awareness and preparedness [87, 88] . In the UK, the 2007 flood was called a 'game changer' and in Germany the 2013 flood in Germany was described as a 'focusing event' [89] . It is fair to conclude that both floods may be considered as 'game-changers' and resulted in a heightened awareness of flood risk, increased investment in flood defences, clearer and more accurate flood warnings and an increasing emphasis on citizens taking more responsibility for flood preparedness [90] . In the UK, after a period of considerable investment in flood protection the Environment Agency is currently consulting on a new policy of strategic withdrawal. In Germany, flood insurance may soon become the norm as the federal government reconsiders its role in providing aid.
In Catcliffe, substantial progress has been made in improving flood protection since 2007 [91] by raising the piling along the River Rother and by building a new slipway on the Ulley reservoir. Local volunteers have also helped clear debris from drains and culverts. In Dreiflüsse-Eck damage to historic buildings, including the theatre, the new town hall, museums and university, increased political pressure on the Federal government to increase spending on the Altstadt-Passau Flood Action Programme 2020 and the Danube Flood Protection Programme [92] . However, with several years' hindsight, it is apparent that important aspects of flood management and risk reduction remain unclear and that much still needs to be done. In the UK, the Environment Agency lacks powers to prevent development in flood risk areas, householders with homes at risk are not installing mitigation measures and the FloodRe approach to uninsurable homes is unsustainable. In Germany, there are issues of coordination across large catchments that cross regional, state or national borders and some of the risk reduction measures have proved to be ineffective [93] . Many homes and businesses continue to be at risk from major floods and more progress needs to be made in making them more resilient and in both countries the insurance sector could play a much bigger role in 'building back better'. Homes and businesses will continue to be damaged in major floods. The speed of recovery will most probably remain the same and it will be difficult to reduce recovery time for badly flooded homes to less than 18 months. Further progress needs to be made in making homes and businesses more resilient.
Data accessibility. Data available from the Dryad Digital Repository: https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.1zcrjdfnj [94] .
